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Experiences in Iraq
by Scott Ritter, former chief UN Weapons Inspector in Iraq
This is the recap of a talk given at the February 10, 2002 CDHS monthly meeting. At our February meeting, Scott Ritter, former chief UN weapons inspector, outlined the history of the UN's actions to uncover Iraq's weapons programs. Making very compelling statements about the definition of patriotism and the inaccuracy of the expression "a good war," he also shed light on the implications of President Bush's remarks concerning an "Axis of Evil." Regarding the concept of a "good war," Ritter can tell us from personal experience that there is no such thing. War is about killing, death, and destruction (including large numbers of innocent victims, an example of which is that the number of Afghan civilians killed in the war on terror has exceeded the numbers killed in the September 11th attacks). Ritter points this out not to draw a moral comparison, but as an example of what happens in war). Although war is never good, there is such a thing as a just war and this is it. We have the right to defend ourselves (Article 51, UN charter) and are justified in destroying the Taliban, going into Afghanistan, and hunting down Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. However, we must be wary of what the U.S. is preparing to do beyond that. President Bush's use of the term. "Axis of Evil" is very ominous. Certainly, these countries represent an ideology different than ours, but they didn't attack us on September 11th - a distinction that should be remembered or the war could expand to a global one. Ritter is disturbed by the changing definition of patriotism since September 11th, which is reflected in an "either you are with us or against us" attitude. What makes a democracy work, he says, is people engaging in debate and showing a willingness to challenge their government; something he hasn't seen a lot of since Sept 11th. Rhetoric from the President is encouraging the notion that the terrorists had help from Iraq, but the evidence coming out of Afghanistan doesn't support this. This has motivated the Bush Administration to take a different approach and renew demands for weapons inspections. Rather than a genuine effort to locate weapons of mass destruction, Ritter sees this as yet another example of the U.S.' continuing "containment" of Saddam Hussein. Since the beginning of the Gulf War, the U.S. had other goals beside the international community's goal of liberating Kuwait. What was our justification for going to war with Iraq, Ritter asks. Oil not being a good rallying cry, George Bush Senior asked us to "engage evil personified" and confront Hussein, all the while hoping we would forget past U.S. support of him. Before the Gulf War, Hussein's "three pillars of power" were:
After Desert Storm, weapons of mass destruction constituted the only remaining pillar. When Hussein didn't crumble as expected in the first 6 months of economic sanctions, he became a political deadweight for George Bush Senior. The U.S. justified continued containment of Hussein by pointing to his weapons of mass destruction as risks to international peace. The goals of the UN Security Council and the U.S. Government differed. The Security Council sought the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, but the U.S. also wanted a change of government in Iraq and manipulated international law to get it. Hussein had to accept the inspectors, but used them to enhance his image. The U.S was causing their suffering, he told his people. Any Iraqi who dared contradict him was arrested, tortured and killed (Starting in summer of 1991, 5,000 children under age 5 died each month in Iraq due to effects of economic sanctions. Hussein is not hurt by sanctions as he has his own water-purification and power-generation plants). Iraq's continuous lies, denials, and resistance to weapons inspections forced the inspectors to look to Europe for information. They obtained receipts, invoices, and all the evidence they needed to prove weapons materials purchasing by Iraq and then confronted them with it. Since Iraq was caught in lies, they were forced to admit their programs and allow inspectors in to chemical plants and factories that were consequently destroyed. However, the initial lies led to the level of verification being set to impossibly high standards. For example, in 1992, the UN weapons inspectors had to search wreckage for the serial numbers of 98 missiles that Iraq admitted to having and destroying. They found 96 out of 98. Although the missing two were probably destroyed as well, without the serial numbers to prove it, Iraq was technically not in compliance. In 1992, after meeting strong resistance to the idea that our relationship with Hussein could be improved, Clinton continued Bush's policy of economic sanctions and containment. By 1994 the UN weapons inspectors had done as much as they could in a conventional manner and Scott Ritter then went to Israel to seek information on the remaining 5-10% of weapons that remained unaccounted for. However, there was no proof that this 5-10% still existed or represented a threat. The pressure to push this issue came from the fact that the U.S. would have no excuse to continue containment without it. (These economic sanctions have come with a price - 500,000 dead children by 1996. Madeleine Albright at one point stated economic sanctions would continue regardless of compliance. They would remain until Hussein is gone. However, this was U.S. policy, not the policy of the UN weapons inspectors). Israel indicated that the individuals in Iraq who would have information about whatever weapons remained would be those involved in "presidential security." The inspectors did surveillance in Iraq to figure out how presidential security worked. This was more an attempt by the U.S. to get at Hussein than to find weapons. The U.S. finally stopped weapons inspections when it was close to solving the puzzle of the supposed missing 5-10%, because this would end the justification for containment of Hussein. Because this was in conflict with Ritter's goals as a UN weapons inspector, he resigned. There is no viable opposition group within Iraq for the U.S. to support. September 11th is giving the president an opportunity to live up to past campaign promises to get rid of Hussein. Hussein is a despicable person, but not such a threat to us anymore. "This Axis of Evil", Ritter says, "is a figment of the neo-conservative imagination in Washington DC designed to build in an irresponsible fashion upon the patriotic fervor that has emerged in this nation post-September 11th. We are getting ready to go to war against Iraq not because Iraq constitutes a threat to national security, but because Saddam Hussein's continued survival constitutes a threat to the political ideologies of a handful of neo-conservative elements who are, frankly speaking, hijacking our security interests." We would win, Ritter says, but we will also lose. It won't be like Afghanistan. Iraq's army will not give in easily and the Iraqi citizens will not welcome our troops, who will be seen as be infidels and occupiers. We can look to Somalia for an example of how it will play out. We need access to Iraq's oil and stability in the region and this is not the way to achieve it. Scott Ritter closed with the following statement: "We need to bring sanity back into our policy on Iraq. Unfortunately, I think it's too late, but we can't stop trying. And it's going to require the concerted efforts of patriotic Americans who define patriotism as our god given right to engage our brain and use it to become better educated citizens and then do what functioning democracies require of their citizens. Speak out when they see their government doing something wrong in their name. Hold our elected representatives accountable. Unless we do this, unless the American public wakes up, we're going to be at war with Iraq and it's going to be a war that has extremely devastating consequences not only for the United States, but for the rest of the world." Contact us for further information at info@humanistsociety.org Send website comments to webmaster@humanistsociety.org Return to CDHS Home |
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